In this follow-up to our “Dragon versus the Hedgehog” discussion, Greymantle’s editor-in-chief, Ivor Greymantle, sits down once again with naval strategist Richard Jupa. This time, the focus is not on a total invasion or blockade, but on a more limited, high-risk, high-reward scenario: the seizure of Taiwan’s southern port of Kaohsiung. Could this narrower objective be Beijing’s path to victory? Or would it simply trigger the foreign intervention China dreads most?
Why Kaohsiung?
Ivor Greymantle: Richard, we’ve covered the blockade strategy at length. But today, let’s dig into the “Kaohsiung Gambit” you wrote about — seizing Taiwan’s southern port first. Why Kaohsiung?
Richard Jupa: Kaohsiung is Taiwan’s jugular vein. It’s the island’s largest port, handling about 70% of its container traffic and the lion’s share of bulk imports — fuel, coal, raw materials. If Beijing holds Kaohsiung, Taiwan is strangled even without a full island invasion.
There’s also geography. Southern Taiwan is flatter and less urbanized than the northern approaches to Taipei. From the perspective of an amphibious planner, it’s marginally more feasible. So the gambit is simple: strike south, dig in before Taiwan or the Americans can throw you out, and then dare the world to pay the cost of ejecting you.
Amphibious Reality Check
Ivor Greymantle: But doesn’t this still require a large amphibious landing? Can China pull that off?
Richard Jupa: They could probably put 20,000 troops ashore in the first wave. That’s enough to seize key port facilities and the surrounding ground if everything goes right. But the real challenge isn’t getting there — it’s staying there.
Kaohsiung sits within range of Taiwan’s artillery, missile batteries, and reserves. Even if Chinese marines storm ashore, Taiwan would counterattack with everything it has. Sustaining that lodgment requires rapid reinforcement, and reinforcement requires that Kaohsiung’s port remain functional. But ports don’t stay intact in modern combat — cranes get destroyed, fuel tanks burn, channels are mined.
For Beijing, the clock would be merciless. Secure Kaohsiung fast, repair it enough to flow reinforcements, and consolidate before the U.S. Seventh Fleet and Japanese Self-Defense Forces mobilize. If the lodgment stalls, the gambit collapses.
Limited Victory or Endless Stalemate?
Ivor Greymantle: Let’s assume Beijing does take Kaohsiung. What then? Do they stop, or push north?
Richard Jupa: That’s the razor’s edge. Holding Kaohsiung alone could strangle Taiwan within months. Taipei would struggle to retake it — retaking a dense urban port city is a nightmare. And foreign allies would hesitate to launch an urban assault that could kill tens of thousands of civilians.
So Beijing could try to freeze the conflict there, using Kaohsiung as a bargaining chip: “We don’t need Taipei, but we can squeeze you until you concede political ground.” It’s a coercive foothold.
But here’s the catch — stopping at Kaohsiung risks stalemate. Taiwan wouldn’t capitulate easily. Its the government could relocate north, TSMC would still function, and international outrage would mount. The U.S. might retaliate economically or even impose a counter-blockade on China itself. Beijing gains leverage, yes, but also enormous blowback.
Prize and Trap
Ivor Greymantle: So Kaohsiung is both prize and trap. If it falls, Taiwan’s survival is in question. But if Beijing fails or stalls, China faces humiliation.
Richard Jupa: Exactly. The gambit’s appeal is speed. A lightning seizure of Kaohsiung offers the illusion of a bloodless stranglehold. But Taiwan isn’t a passive victim. It’s spent decades preparing for just this kind of assault. Coastal defenses, missile units, rapid reaction brigades — all aimed at blunting a lodgment.
And we can’t ignore morale. A failed Kaohsiung landing wouldn’t just be a tactical defeat. It would be a geopolitical disaster for Beijing, exposing weakness in the PLA and emboldening Taiwan’s allies. Think of Britain’s Suez Crisis in 1956 — a failed gamble that redefined global power alignments. A botched Kaohsiung operation could be China’s Suez moment.
The Semiconductor Question
Ivor Greymantle: Richard, one last thought. If Kaohsiung falls, what happens to the semiconductor question? TSMC is in the north. Does China gain what it wants?
Richard Jupa: Not directly. Kaohsiung gives Beijing leverage, not chips. TSMC and the advanced fabs are concentrated around Hsinchu and Taipei. To seize those intact, Beijing would still need to push north.
But Kaohsiung changes the strategic equation. It gives China a bargaining chip — a stranglehold that says, “Concede autonomy, or watch your economy collapse.” Whether Taiwan or the world would let them keep that foothold is another matter. The gamble buys leverage, not final victory.
Wider Risks and Escalation
Ivor Greymantle: Let’s broaden the lens. How does a Kaohsiung seizure affect the regional order?
Richard Jupa: It detonates it. Japan cannot tolerate Chinese control of southern Taiwan — it places the PLA Navy astride critical sea lanes that feed Japan’s economy. Australia, too, would view it as a direct threat to Indo-Pacific security. The U.S. alliance network, already stretched, would be under intense pressure to respond.
But escalation is tricky. Do allies launch a counter-amphibious assault on Kaohsiung? That’s bloody and uncertain. Do they blockade China? That risks global economic collapse. The gambit forces democracies into dilemmas, which is exactly Beijing’s design. Yet the very act of seizing Kaohsiung could forge the Pacific alliance into a firmer, more militarized coalition — the opposite of what Beijing intends.
Historical Parallels
Ivor Greymantle: Are there historical precedents for this kind of “limited seizure”?
Richard Jupa: A few. Think of Argentina’s seizure of the Falklands in 1982 — a quick strike intended to create facts on the ground and deter outside reversal. It backfired when Britain mobilized and retook the islands.
Or look further back, to Japan’s “salami-slicing” strategy in China during the 1930s: limited seizures of territory designed to avoid full-scale war while shifting the balance step by step. That, too, ultimately escalated into total war.
The lesson is sobering: limited gambits often tempt great powers, but rarely end neatly. Once shots are fired, escalation has its own logic.
Closing Thoughts
Ivor Greymantle: Fascinating as always. The Kaohsiung Gambit remains both the most plausible and the most perilous move in Beijing’s playbook.
Richard Jupa: That’s right, Ivor. Kaohsiung is a dragon’s gamble against a hedgehog’s quills. It tempts Beijing with a quick path to leverage, but history suggests gambles like that rarely end as planned. Victory could strangle Taiwan, but failure could shake the Communist Party itself. Either way, the stakes are immense — not just for Taiwan, but for the global order.
